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Abstract
The growing popularity of digital systems have paved the way for dig-
ital locker that ensures security and safety of the digital documents in
store. While facilitating this system to user and availing its services of-
fered by service provider, non-repudiation of service offered and service
consumed is an important security requirement in the digital locker sys-
tem. In this paper, we present a digital locker system that addresses the
aspect of confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation along with other
security properties. The proposed protocol ensures the confirmed partici-
pation of the user as well as the service provider while accessing the digital
locker. The protocol is analyzed against potential threats in the context
of safety and security of the digital locker system.
Keywords: Digital locker; Security; Confidentiality; Authorization; Non-
repudiation.
1 Introduction
It has been witnessed that the exponential growth of mobile devices along with
the massive power of Internet has eased up the ways of people living. Digital
initiatives for facilitating daily needs, whether it is for paying bills, banking, e-
learning or e-governance, are encouraging more and more users to come online
for saving time as well as money [4]. One of the efficient services of this digital
move is to have a digital store in cloud, so that the user can access the service
from anywhere and anytime. Digital assets including personal and professional
documents are being stored on drive from where it can be accessed in minutes
irrespective of time and location. These storage facilities such as Google drive
[5], Dropbox [7], OneDrive [6] give us the facility to not only store the docu-
ments on the cloud, but also to give different levels of access to different people.
This brings the notion of Digital Locker [2], [3] in which storing, accessing and
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ensuring the authenticity and accountability of digital assets have become much
more efficient and secure.
Digital locker is a digital safe with the objective of keeping important documents
safe and secure under a mutually trusted arrangement [1], [8], [9]. The storage
and transfer of the documents take place mostly on an online platform, which
facilitates anytime-anywhere access to documents. One of the important objec-
tives of the digital locker is to ensure non-repudiation of the parties involved as
well as the confidentiality and integrity of the documents [8]. Imagine a scenario
wherein documents stored in the locker are manipulated by the user, and then
the user can easily blame it on the service provider denying its involvement in
the act. Alternatively, the service provider can also alter the documents and
put the blame on the user for being involved in the act of misdeed. Ideally,
the locker should be opened when both the user as well as the service provider
participate in the process, which usually happens in operating of physical locker
system [9] used in real-world applications. Therefore, for any transaction with
the locker both the service provider and service consumer are equally responsi-
ble and answerable for any misconduct intentionally or accidentally. A typical
scenario of conventional locker access system is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Conventional Locker System
Our contributions: In this paper, we present a protocol for securing digi-
tal locker system that ensures the locker access is given to the user only on
the participation of both the user key and the service provider key. All nec-
essary validations of user and service provider participation takes place inside
the locker system, which is managed securely by the service provider’s storage
system. A trusted module acts as the safe locker, performs all operations af-
ter checking credentials of user’s request and service provider’s consent. The
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proposed protocol is analyzed against potential threats in the context of digital
locker system and shown secure against repudiation, replay and impersonation
attacks.
The organization of the paper: The remaining of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 presents the protocol for securing digital locker system.
Section 3 analyzes the proposed protocol. We conclude the paper in Section 4.
2 Digital Locker System
2.1 System Model and Design Goal
The system consists of three entities – User, Service Provider and the Locker
Module. The assumptions and functionalities of these entities are listed below:
User: User is required to register at the service provider for availing the services
of the locker system. For this, the user is prompted to submit a secret key Ki
and a secret question m. The user chooses m to be something that the user can
remember at a later time for logging into the system. The secret m is encrypted
and the secret key Ki is hashed and stored at the locker system. User secret
key Ki is not known to the locker system.
Service Provider: The service provider uses the secret key R to connect to
the locker. Without service provider’s involvement the user cannot get access
to the locker. All the functions performed and all the information stored within
the locker system are assumed to be unavailable to the service provider’s server.
The master secret key R of the service provider is not known to the user.
Locker Module: This functionality ensures the participation of the parties,
both user and the service provider. The system has h(Ki) and h(R) stored in
it for verification of the secret keys of user and service provider, respectively.
It also stores the user secret m appended with user secret key Ki encrypted as
EL(m‖Ki), where L is a computed symmetric key.
Design Goal. There are two main design objectives of the proposed protocol.
Firstly, there should be participation of both the entities for accessing the locker
just like that in a physical locker system. For example, a physical locker in a
bank requires user to insert the user’s key as well as the bank’s key. Later,
in case of any theft or misconduct, the bank cannot back out denying its par-
ticipation nor can the user put false allegations on the bank. Thus, ensuring
non-repudiation of both parties in the digital locker system is an integral re-
quirement. Secondly, the user can verify the computation results and can send
an acknowledgement message to the locker module. If the acknowledgement
is correct, then only the locker opens and the user is allowed access. In other
words, the locker module ensures the usage of user’s key and service provider’s
key before opening the digital lock for accessing user’s digital assets.
The symbols and notations used in the protocol are described in Table 1.
We note that m is a secret question that must be remembered by the user
without storing it. Upon successful validation of the user into the locker system,
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Figure 2: The System Model
Notation Description
R the master secret key of the bank which will be needed to
ensure the participation of the bank.
Ki the key of i
th user.
Na the random number generated by the user for each session.
m the secret question chosen by the user during the time of
registration.
Nr the random number generated by the locker facility for each
session.
Ks the shared symmetric key between user and the locker sys-
tem.
L the symmetric key with which locker encrypts the correct
version of user key and the secret message.
Ex(message) the message is encrypted with x.
Dx(message) the message in decrypted with x.
Table 1: Symbols and Notations used in the Protocol
the user can see this m on the screen.
2.2 The Proposed Protocol
The protocol consists of a one-time Setup phase, and Locker Access phase as
when user wants to access the locker system.
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2.2.1 Setup phase
The user requests to connect to the service provider server. The connection
to the service provider server is done through a secure TLS connection over
HTTPS [11], [10]. Once secure session is established between user and service
provider, the user requests access to the locker facility of the service provider.
All the messages between the user and the locker system are sent through the
service provider server (e.g. like bank acts the service provider between the user
and the physical locker in conventional locker system). Each user, say Ui, selects
a different secret key Ki for accessing the locker system. The service provider
has a master key R known to service provider server only. It is assumed that
the secret keys of the users and the master key of the service provider remain
uncompromised. The locker system stores the hash of the < user id, user key>,
that is h(Ui‖Ki) as well as the hash of the server key h(R). Each user submits
a secret question m to the server at the time of registration. The secret m is
stored in the locker system corresponding to each user. The secret m is a word
or a phrase that is easy for the user to remember and verify. The locker system
computes a symmetric key L as h(Ui‖Ki) ⊕ h(R). The user secret message m,
and Ki are stored in the locker system encrypted with this symmetric key L
as EL(m‖Ki‖Ui). All other message exchanges are encrypted with the help of
the shared secret key Ks as computed in the Verification and Access of Locker
phase explained below.
2.2.2 Locker Access phase
This phase is comprised of User-Locker Authentication and Locker Access sub-
phases.
User and Locker Authentication: User Ui generates a random number Na.
The value of a pseudo-random function PRFh(Ui‖Ki)(Na) is calculated with
h(Ui‖Ki) as the key. The user sends PRFh(Ui‖Ki)(Na) and Na to the locker
system. When PRFh(Ui‖Ki)(Na) and Na are sent through the service provider
server, the locker system verifies h(Ui‖Ki) by computing PRFh(Ui‖Ki)(Na) with
its pre-stored value of h(Ui‖Ki). If the computed value does not match with
the received one, then the user is notified with an error message stating that
the key submitted was incorrect. If the values match, then the process is car-
ried forward. If the user is verified, the locker system requests for the service
provider master key R. On getting the service provider master key, the locker
system calculates h(R) and matches it with the pre-stored value. In case of
mismatch of this verification, the authentication of service provider cannot be
established, and as a result, the user’s request gets denied. The instruction-flow
of the locker access system is shown in Figure 3.
Locker Access: Following operations are performed to ensure that both user
and the service provider participate in accessing the locker system.
Step-1. The user symmetric key L is calculated as L = h(Ui‖Ki) ⊕ h(R), which
is used to decrypt the pre-stored encrypted message EL(m‖Ki‖Ui). On
decrypting the message, Ki is extracted from (m‖Ki‖Ui).
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Figure 3: The work-flow of the Locker System Access
Step-2. Locker system then computes the shared secret keyKs asKs = h(Ui‖Ki‖Na)
using the user secret key Ki and the random number Na sent by the user.
Step-3. The Locker generates a random number Nr.
Step-4. The secret message m and Nr have to protected while transmitting
them to the user. The locker system encrypts the user secret message m
and Nr with Ks and sends it to the user.
Once the user receives the message from the locker, it also computes the sym-
metric key Ks. It uses the freshly computed Ks to decrypt the received message
and gets the secret message m. This secret message is verified by the user. If
the secret messagem is displayed correctly it ensures correctness of the protocol
as follows: (i) the server master key R was submitted correctly by the service
provider server and hence also ensuring its participation, and (ii) since the Ks
is computed using the random number Na given by the user, it ensures the
freshness property. After confirming the correctness of the secret message m,
the user sends an acknowledgement to the locker system. It computes a digest
h(Na‖Nr) with Nr and Na as inputs and transmits it to the locker system. The
locker already has Na and Nr and thus it verifies this digest by recomputing
h(Na‖Nr). This is done to ensure the user’s agreement to access the locker ser-
vices. Once the verification is succeeded, the locker services are made available
to the user. If the secret message m is not decrypted properly, that is, if not
confirmed by the user then one of the above statements is invalid and hence
user does not send back the acknowledgement. If the locker does not receive
the confirmation within certain time period it ends the current session with-
out opening the locker to the user. After the successful authentication of the
user-locker system, the Locker Access works with Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Locker Access
1: Locker computes user’s key L as L = h(Ui‖Ki) ⊕ h(R).
2: Locker decrypts EL(m‖Ki‖Ui) using the key L and obtains m and Ki for
the user.
3: Locker computes the shared secret key Ks = h(Ui‖Ki‖Na), where Na is
provided by the user.
4: Locker generates a random number Nr.
5: Locker encrypts EKs(m‖Nr) and sends it to the user.
6: User decrypts EKs(m‖Nr) and gets the secret message m.
7: User sends an acknowledgement h(Na‖Nr) to the Locker.
8: Upon receiving user’s acknowledgement the locker verifies it and allows the
user to access the Locker space allocated for the user.
The DigiLock protocol is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: DigiLock: The proposed protocol
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3 Security Analysis
We note that the proposed protocol for locker system is run under the protection
of TLS protocol. In other words, the message exchange between the participat-
ing entities in the proposed locker system is done through a secure channel. On
top of the TLS protection, we show that the proposed locker system is secure
against repudiation, replay and impersonation attacks.
Security against repudiation. Non-repudiation being a major issue in digi-
tal locker system, is addressed in our protocol as it ensures the participation of
both the entities the user and the service provider, so that at a later time none
of them can back out from their participation in the accessing of the locker.
The encryption key L is computed using both Ki (key of the user) and R (key
of the service provider). Assume that the user is sending incorrect K ′
i
. Then
the computation of encryption key will be as follows.
L′= h(Ui‖K
′
i
) ⊕ h(R)
D′
L
(EL(m‖Ki‖Ui))
Since the encryption is done with the key that involved the true Ki, the message
will not be decrypted properly. As a result, the message m will not be displayed
on the screen and thereby, locker will not open. Same is the case if the service
provider enters an incorrect R. If either of them do not participate or provide
a faulty input, then the message m is not decrypted properly and the locker
will not open. Therefore, for availing the locker services, the message m has to
be displayed correctly for which the participation of both user and the service
provider is essential.
Security against replay attack. If an attacker tries to replay messages in-
tercepted from previous run of the protocol to make locker system believe that
its a genuine user, then the attacker will not succeed because the locker system
always calculates Ks with the fresh nonce Na generated by the user.
Suppose the attacker A intercepts a message from an older session and uses it
in the current session to manipulate the user U and the locker server L, i.e.,
replays an older message to manipulate the user or locker server into believing
that they are communicating with the each other.
U → A : PRFh(Ui‖Ki)(Na), Na
A → L : PRFh(Ui‖Ki)(N
′
a
), N ′
a
As the Na inside the function matches with the external one, locker thinks that
it has got message from right user and authenticates the sender. It then does
the computations as follows.
K ′
s
= h(Ui‖Ki‖N
′
a
)
L→ A : {m,Nr}K
′
s
A → U : {m,Nr}K
′
s
U computes the key Ks = h(Ui‖Ki‖Na)
The secret message m does not get decrypted properly as K ′
s
6= Ks and hence
the decrypted message m′ 6= m. Therefore, the user does not send the acknowl-
edgement message to the locker, thereby, mitigating the replay attack.
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Security against impersonation attack. The user key Ki is kept confiden-
tial and uncompromised, which prevents any adversary to impersonate the user.
Suppose that the server S tries to impersonate the user, i.e., tries to imitate the
behaviour of the user without hinting the locker system about it by computing
the following:
U → S : PRFh(Ui‖Ki)(Na), Na
S → L : PRFh(Ui‖Ki)(Na), Na
Now since the Na inside the function matches with the external one, locker
thinks that it has got message from right user and authenticates the sender. It
then computes
L→ S : {m,Nr}Ks
Now, S that is for example, the service provider cannot decrypt the message as it
cannot compute Ks because it does not have Ki. No acknowledgement message
will be sent to the locker. As a result, locker impersonation by the server
is prevented in our protocol. Furthermore, suppose that the service provider
tries to imitate the locker system. As we have stated above, we assume that
all the information stored in the locker is concealed from the service provider
server. Thus, the service provider will not have access to the encrypted message.
Therefore, it cannot send the message back to the user for further verification.
4 Conclusion
Digital lockers are becoming popular in modern digital space because of its ease
of use from anywhere and at anytime. We have proposed a locker system that
ensures the participation of both the user and the server so as to ensure non-
repudiation of participatory role of availing as well as facilitating this service.
In addition, the proposed protocol ensures the data confidentiality and integrity
during the message exchange of the protocol. The proposed protocol mitigates
impersonation, replay attacks, and ensures that any illegitimate party is not
able to breach the security of the locker system.
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